The U.S. Justice
Department released the below information:
An employee of the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) pleaded guilty today to charges related to
his disclosure of classified national defense information (NDI) to two
journalists in 2018 and 2019.
“Frese violated the
trust placed in him by the American people when he disclosed sensitive national
security information for personal gain,” said Assistant Attorney General for
National Security John C. Demers. “He alerted our country’s adversaries to
sensitive national defense information, putting the nation’s security at
risk. The government takes these breaches seriously and will use all the
resources at our disposal to apprehend and prosecute those who jeopardize the
safety of this country and its citizens.”
“Henry Kyle Frese was
entrusted with Top Secret information related to the national defense of our
country,” said G. Zachary Terwilliger, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District
of Virginia. “Frese violated that trust, the oath he swore to uphold, and
engaged in felonious conduct at the expense of our country. This case should
serve as a clear reminder to all of those similarly entrusted with National
Defense Information that unilaterally disclosing such information for personal
gain, or that of others, is not selfless or heroic, it is criminal.”
“Mr. Frese violated
his sworn oath to protect the American people and uphold the Constitution of
the United States by using his access to the United States’ most sensitive
information and steal state secrets for nothing more than personal gain,” said
Robert Wells, Acting Assistant Director of the FBI's Counterintelligence
Division. “The men and women of the FBI who investigated this case swore the
same oath but unlike Mr. Frese, they chose to uphold it. I am proud of the work
they did to hold Mr. Frese accountable for his actions.”
"By disseminating
the same classified information he had pledged to protect, Henry Kyle Frese put
the US and our national defense equities in danger," said Timothy R.
Slater, Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI's Washington Field Office.
"The US Government and the American public depend on trusted government
employees to keep such information out of the hands of our adversaries, who
could use it to cause us harm. The FBI's counterintelligence mission is
to protect our country's information and secrets in order to safeguard our
future; and the men and women of the FBI will continue to work hard to preserve
that information."
According to court
documents, Henry Kyle Frese, 31, of Alexandria, was employed by DIA as a
counterterrorism analyst from February 2018 to October 2019, and held a Top
Secret//Sensitive Compartmented Information security clearance. United States
government agencies have confirmed that in the spring and summer of 2018, News
Outlet 1 published eight articles, all authored by the same journalist
(Journalist 1) that contained classified NDI that related to the capabilities
of certain foreign countries’ weapons systems. These articles contained
classified intelligence from five intelligence reports (the Compromised
Intelligence Reports) made available to appropriately cleared recipients in the
first half of 2018. The topic of all of these initial five Compromised
Intelligence Reports – foreign countries’ weapons systems – was outside the
scope of Frese’s job duties as an analyst covering CT topics. The media
articles, and the intelligence reporting from which they were derived, both
contained information that is classified up to the TS//SCI level, indicating
that its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to result in
exceptionally grave damage to the national security. The intelligence reporting
was marked as such.
According to court
documents, Frese and Journalist 1 lived together at the same residential
address from January 2018 to November 2018. Throughout 2018 and 2019, Frese and
Journalist 1 “followed” each other on Twitter, and on at least two occasions
Frese re-Tweeted Journalist 1’s Tweets announcing the publications of articles
containing NDI classified at the Top Secret level.
In or about April of
2018, Journalist 1 introduced Frese to a second journalist (Journalist
2). Subsequently, Frese began texting and speaking with Journalist 2 by
telephone. Between mid-2018 and late September 2019, Frese orally transmitted
NDI classified at the Top Secret level to Journalist 1 on 12 separate
occasions, and orally transmitted NDI classified at the Secret level to
Journalist 1 on at least four occasions. Frese knew the information was
classified at the Secret and Top Secret levels because the intelligence
products from which he had learned the classified information had visible
classification markings as to the classification level of the information, and
the intelligence products accessed by Frese were stored on secure, classified
government information systems.
In relation to one of
the 12 times Frese orally transmitted Top Secret NDI to Journalist 1, in or
about mid-April to early May 2018, Frese accessed an intelligence report
unrelated to his job duties on multiple occasions, which contained NDI
classified at the Top Secret//SCI level (Intelligence Report l). A week after
Frese accessed Intelligence Report 1 for the second time, Frese received an
April 27, 2018 Twitter Direct Message (DM) from Journalist 1 asking whether
Frese would be willing to speak with Journalist 2. Frese stated that he was
“down” to help Journalist 2 if it helped Journalist 1 “progress.” During the
same April 27, 2018, Twitter exchange, Journalist 1 indicated that a certain
United States military official told Journalist 2 that the official was not
aware of the subject matter discussed in Intelligence Report 1. Frese
characterized the official’s denial as “weird” and commented on the source of
information contained within Intelligence Report 1.
Several days after the
April 27, 2018, Twitter exchange, Frese searched on a classified United States
government computer system for terms related to the topics contained in
Intelligence Report 1. A few hours after searching for terms related to the
topic of Intelligence Report l, Frese spoke by telephone with Journalist 1, and
several hours later he spoke by telephone with Journalist 2. Immediately
after the call with Journalist 2, Journalist 1 called Frese. During at least
one of the calls with Journalist 1 and Journalist 2, Frese orally passed Top
Secret NDI derived from Intelligence Report 1. Approximately 30 minutes after
Frese spoke with the two journalists, Journalist 1 published an article
(Article 1) which contained Top Secret NDI, orally communicated by Frese and
derived from Intelligence Report 1 classified at the Top Secret//SCI level.
On at least 30
separate occasions in 2018, Frese conducted searches on classified government
systems for information regarding the classified topics he discussed with
Journalists 1 and 2. On multiple occasions in 2018 and 2019, Frese conducted
searches on classified government systems because of specific requests for
information from Journalists 1 and 2.
Additionally, between
early 2018 and October 2019, Frese communicated with an employee of an overseas
CT consulting group (Consultant 1) via social media. On at least two occasions,
Frese transmitted classified NDI related to CT topics to Consultant 1, using a
social media site’s direct messaging feature.
Frese pleaded guilty
to the willful transmission of Top Secret national defense information, and
faces a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison when sentenced on June 18, 2020,
at 9:30 am. Actual sentences for federal crimes are typically less than the
maximum penalties. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence
after taking into account the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory
factors.
Assistant U.S.
Attorneys Neil Hammerstrom and Danya E. Atiyeh, and Trial Attorney Jennifer
Kennedy Gellie of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and
Export Control Section are prosecuting the case.
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